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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
ve. 
PETERS PLPMBIXG &:. HEATING COI\lP ANY, 
SALT LAKE AC'l'O ACCTIOX T:'JC., AND 
E\m~\f:t\TTY !XSURAXCE OOMPANY OF 
KOHTH A}fERlCA, 
De.fendants and Respondent.o. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SECTION 45-1-65, U'I_'AH COJH; AKXO'J'AT.tm 1903, 
DOES 1\0T RELIEVE SALT LAKE AUTO AL"C-
TIOK IXC. FROM THI<} Rr;SPONSTBTLlTY A.'D 
DUTY '1'0 DELlVEH CERTIFICATE OF TITLE. 
Plaintiff'o; complaint alleges that Salt Lake Auto 
Auction sold the 1958 Chevrolet automobile to George 
B. \Vest knowing that said George B. \Vest purchased 
said automobile for the purpose of selling the same and 
that said George R. West did sell said automobile (Com-
plaint, paragraphs 5 and 6 of Second Claim for Relief). 
ThE' respondents' brief overlooks or avoido; the fact that 
the complaint alleges that the Rank purchased the con-
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ditional sales contract eov1or·ing the :";tth• of the Chevrolet 
automobile from George B. \Vest and paid utbw for 
the conditional sales contract in respondent~' discussion 
of estoppel. 
The provisions of SE'dion 41-1-65 do 110t relieve the 
wholesaler from the duty of tramferring title to the 
retailer where the automoloilP sales transaction i., one 
between dealers. The provisiom of 41-1-65 merely relieve 
the selling dealer rrom obtaining a transfer of ncgist-
ration of such ..-ehicle when the sale i.~ to another dealer, 
hut specifically n·quires a transfer of the then existing 
title. 
"41-1-63. TRAN.S"F'ER '1'0 nEALER when 
tl1c transferee of a vehiele is a deal1'r wbo lwlds 
the same for n'~ail' . . . . Tl1P. transferee shall 
not be required to obtain tran~l'Pr of registration 
of such vehielc or forward the certificates of title 
and registration to the department, but ~wh 
trnu->fcrcc upon lransfcrring liis title or in.'N-eM 
to an."other J!<':rSOfl shall cxcc;de and ar·k111mledge 
an a8~,;.(f!lmfnt and tcarranl.i! of tii!,-· upon the 
cerlifiwlr of title und d,-fil"l'r ilu' .':1.'11/f lliid their 
certi.fiu;te o.f rcgicdrafion lo /fir pcrsof!. to whom 
,•!](ch llonsfet· is made." (ltalics supplied) 
The failure to deliwi" Uw t.ilte certificate of t.he 
nntornobile in que~tion to the tra.nsfel"(•r WeHt or to the 
pu1·cha~er from West eoMtitntPs a violation of the act 
and the condition of the bond 
Section ..J.l-:l-23(D), "Ctah Code AnnotatPd 1953, pro-
vide~ as follow,;: 
"PROHIBITED AC'l'~ OR OMISSIOKS-
VIOL.\.'riOX BY LICENSEE. - 1t shall be un-
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lawful and a violation of this act for the holder 
of any license i><~IIE'd under the terms and pro-
visiom hereof: ... (D) To violate any law of 
the statl' of Utah now existing or hereafter en-
acted respecting commcrC'e in motor vehicleR or 
any lawful rule or regulation respecting com-
merce in motor vehicle:-> pr·ornulgated by any lic-
ensing or regulating authority now existing or 
hereaFter created hy the laws of the ~tate of 
Utah." 
Section 41-3-18 giv1.·~ a right of action agaimt the 
licen~e dealer and the fmret;; upon the dealers bond for 
"violation of any of the provisions of tl1is act ... " Thus, 
the failure of Salt TJake Anto Auction to deliver title 
to the automobile in question to George B. "\Vest or to 
tlw persons to whom he has sold the automohile or sold 
the title thereto is a violation of the act and gives the 
plaintiff a right of action against Salt Lake Auto Auc-
tion Inc. and it~ bondsmen, Indemnitv Tn:mranc-c Coni-
parry of North America, for damages. 
POI.:\'!' II. 
PIJAINTIFF BANK IS XOT CIL\RO!i~D VliTH 
KNOVVLEDGJ-; OF TT'l'LE IN AXYOXE O'f'Hl<JR 
'rHAN GEOHG.J<..; B. WLST. 
The respondents in their brief refening to the 
plaintiff a~ "the Bank" at page 13, state: 
"The Bank knowo<, or certainly should knuw, 
that in order for a dealer to have m:y right to 
sell a motor vehicle he mu;;t have ir1 his pos-
session the title document~ thereto, .... " 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
plaintiff Bank knew or should have known that the' dealer 
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G-eorge R. West had ItO right to seli the Clw~Tolet auto-
mobile. On the contrary, the record slwws "that at th!O! 
time the po~se~~ion of said motor \·chicle was delivered 
to the mid George B. Wesl ... Salt Lake Auto Auction 
knew that ·west intended to offer said motor vehicle 
for sale." 'l'hat under such circumstances Salt Lake 
Auto Auction i~ estopped, has been discussed in ap-
pellants brief filed herein. 
The mere fact that the plaintil'f is a bank and knows 
of a custom of flooring· cars or of delivering· cars and 
holding ti11c eertil"icatc doe~ not charge it with actual 
or implied knowledge that such was the fact in this 
particular instance. In !.he ( a~l· of l'ommereial Credit 
Company\·~. llarn,~y -:\[otor Company, (CaL) lfi P. 2nd 
1181, and cases cited therein, it was held !hat mere know-
ledge of the general pradir·f' of flooring cars was not 
~ul'ficient to pla,·c on inquiry a bank which parted with 
value in _purcha~ing a title retaining conditional ~uk~ 
contract without actual notice or kno·wledge of the facts 
to vut the bank on inquir·y of the title of a title holder 
who lrad entru~tcd the motor vehicle to a dealer under a 
tr·ust. receipt. 
POIXT III. 
THI<; PROVISIO"i'JS OF SFX''riOX 41-3-3, rT AH 
CODE AXNOTATED 1953, DO XOT B.Alt SUIT 
AGAl}.'ST SALT LAK.I<; ~i.l.-'1'0 ..:\.CC'I'IOX, lKC., OR 
lTS RO)i)DS!IlEX, IXDE:JE"lTY lXSURAXCE C0:'\1-
P.ANY OF NORTH Al\I.ffiRll'~\.. 
Plaintiff'.~ nd.ion against Salt Lake ~\.uto Auction 
rs for damage11 and/or to qnid title to til(' automihle in 
•t•rP:;tion. Sedion 41-3-:l, Utah Code Annotated, merely 
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provides that there shall be no right of action for re-
covef)- of a motor vehicle or any part of the selling 
price thereof by a dealer or his successors or assigns, in 
an.v case where the vendor dealer ::thall have failed to 
comply with the terms and conditions of the act. Plain-
tiff is not sueing Salt Lake Auto Auction for· the pos-
session of the autimobile nor are they sueing them for 
the purchase price as there i~ no contract or purchase 
between Salt Lake Auto Auction and plaintiff. Plaintiff 
seeks to quiet title to the automobile and for its damages 
as against Salt Lake Auto Auction. 
POINT IV. 
SECTION 41-4-3, UTAII CODE ANNOTA'l'ED 1953, 
IS CON'l'RARY 'rG THE CONSTITUTIONS Oli' 'l"HtJ 
STATE OF CTAH AND OJ<' 'l"H.Ii; "CXITED STATES 
OF A}fEHICA, IS CNCOXSTITUTIOXAL AND 
'i'OID. 
Section 41-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 19.13, provide~ 
as follows: 
"CERTIFICAT.l<J OP 'I'ITLE 'j"\J vr;NDEE 
-b'vcry person, firm, or corporalin11 upon tlw 
sale and delivery of any used or SC'eond hand 
motor vehicle shall within forty-eight hours there-
of deliver to the vendee, and endor::ted according-
to law, a certificate of title, issued for ,;aid vehiclP 
by the ~tate tax eormnission.'' 
Section 41-3-3, l~tah Code AnMtated 190::!, pro-
vides as follows: 
"PEXALTIES li'OH YTOLATIOX 0.1<' AC1' 
-No action or right of ariion to recover any su,,h 
motor vehicle, or any part of the selling. pri(-e 
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thereof, sl1all be maintained in the courts of thi~ 
state by any ~ueh dealer or vendor, his -~urreo" 
sor~ or assigns, in any case wherein such vendor 
or dealer shall have failed to comply with the 
terms and provisions of this act, and such vendor 
or dealer, upon conviction for the violation of 
any of the provisions of thi~ act shall be deenwd 
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be puni~hed Ly 
a fine of not more than $299 or b;v~ impri~oument 
for not more than six months in the county iail 
. . ' 
or by both ,;uch fine and imprisonmPnt." 
Section 41-3-3 effects an arbitrary tran~for of the 
property M one private P''rson (Clearfield State Dank) 
to another private person (Pe1et~ Plumbing & Heating 
Company). bul'l1 ~tatute i~ so arbitrary anrl unreason-
able as to be repugnant to the duP proccs~ daru;e ol' both 
the Consti!uli(JJJ of the l~nited States and the Consti-
tution of the State of rtah, and in addition, .;llch statute 
discriminate~ against automobilP sellPr~ and automobile 
sales tran.;aetion~. 
The provi~ions of Sed.ion 41-3-2 fixes a forty-eight 
hour time limit for delivery to the vendee of a ('J'rtil'i(·atf' 
of title i.s:"'tl('d for !he automobile purchased by the State 
'l.'a" Commission of Utah. By reason of the failure of 
the wndor, <Jeorge B. 'Vest. to issue title within forty-
eight hours, the J'i·~pondent~, the \\"hOlP~akr, thl' whole-
saler's bondsman, and the vendee, claim that no action 
c.an be brought ag·ain~1 any of !hem for an~· reason or 
for ttll.\" mnount bec.au~c of tlll' provisions of 41-3-3. 
Set·lion 41-3-3 in di'Pd li>rf"1•its to the n•ndee tho 
propert;.c oft]](' vendor or of persons to whom the vendor 
may ltave n::-:signed or ~old a prO]ll.'l't~· i.ntcn:::-:1 in an 
automobilt• for the failure to deliver a certificate of title. 
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The due proceo;~ provisions of the Constitution of the 
United States and of the State of Utah prolJibit both 
i4tatr and Federal legislation that effects an uncom-
pensated transfer of one person'8 property to another 
private person. 
"There is no rule or prindple lmown to onr 
system under which private property can be taken 
from one person and tran8fcn·ed lo another for 
the private uo;e and benefit of .surh other person, 
whether by general law or special Pnactment." 
Cooley on Constitutional Limit;ltions, 7lh Ed., 
:JI:G-308, Slirl0 vs. Rohmeyer (Wi~.), 260 :\.\V. 
647. 
"\Vhile the amount of a p<malty i~ within the 
control of a legislature in tl1e r'\f'f"{·i,·" of its police 
power, this power is suhieet to the limitdi011 
that the amount must not be so gro~sly excc.~~in• 
af'l to comtitute a deprivation of property "\\ithout 
due proces~ of Jaw and accordingly the imposi-
tion of a pPnalt.v in a named o:um a~ liqnidatc•d 
damages may he so greatly out of proporUon to 
the poso;ible actual damage- and "o arbitrary a:1d 
oppres~ive as to comtitutc a Yidati011 of tlie 
constitutional provisions." 16A C .. J.S. 001-Sn"2, 
Constitutional Law, Seetion 64-0. 
In the case of _}fi.ssouri Paeitie Railroad Company 
WI. Tucker, L~. S. Supreme Court, 2:-m L S. 340, 51 h ~Jd. 
1507, the state of' Kansas had enacted a statutP pre-
scribing rate~ for !.he intrasl.a!{' ~}1ipment of oil, eh'., 
and prescribing a penalty of $500 anrl reasonable at-
torney's fees for exacting, demanding or receiYing any 
sum in excess of the prescribed rate. The plaintiff-
respondent had made a shipment of 25 barreb and was 
charged $3.0~ in excess of the prescribed legislative rate 
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and brought the aelion for his $500 penalty and reason-
able attorney',; fees under the ~latute. The railroad 
company defended upon the ground" that the statutory 
ratrs were confi~catory and void and that the statute 
and particularly the provision for the recovery of $500 
as liquidated damages was ~o arbitrary and unreason-
able as to be requgnant to the due process of law and 
<>qui }lro1edi0ll clause of the 14th Amendmnt to the 
Constitution of the United States . 
. lnstice Van Devanter in delivering the op1mon of 
the U. S. Supreme Court states: 
'·It will be pCrZ'ci'.·r·] that this liability is not 
proportioned to the actual damages. It i~ not 
as if double or treble d:lJtt~l.c;l'" wpJ·e allowed, a3 
often i::; done, a11d as WE' think properly could hav1• 
been done lwrP. Xor is it as if thPre would be 
difficull_1 in proving or ascertaining the actual 
damage~. thereby furnishing a reason for pre-
scribing a liquidated amount reasonably approxi-
mating the probable damages, takinp: one case 
"-ith another ... '\Vha1 the statutE' does i~ to 
authori:-.c a recovery of $300 in every ('a~l', 
whetlF•r the ,.;hipment be of 1 barrel or of lO or 
:!J bar.-pls, or of a tank car; and this altl1ough 
it is of common knowledge that t1u' po,.;Rible dara-
ag-(',.; in respect of tlw <'llal·gp for ,-arr:ing uny 
of tltf'~e from one point in Hw state to anotlwr 
could neYer be more than a small fraction of that 
~urn." 
"As applied to en~p;:. likE' tlw present, the b-
positioll of $300 a::>liquidaiPd damag'f'fl is not only 
gro~sly out of proportion to the po,sible actual 
dtunage~, but i~ ~o arbitrary and oppressi\·e that 
ils enfot·ccment would he nothing short of the 
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taking of property without due process of law, 
and therefore in contravention of the 14th Amend-
' 
" men ... 
fn the ~asl' of Stierle et al vs. Rolnneyer et al, (Wis.) 
260 N."\V. 64i, the constitutionality of a statute canceling 
and deeming a mortgage indebtedness satisfied for the 
failure of mortgagee to comply with the o;tatute relating 
to foredo~ure ·was considered. The plaintiff had loaned 
money jo defendant and taken a real estate mortgage 
and chattel mortgage securing a loan of $5500.00. Prior 
to the time of the suit plaintiff-mortgagee had taken 
possession of ~orne of the property covered by the chattel 
mortgage and sold the same. In so doing mortgagee 
had failed to comply with the requirements of the statute 
relating to the foreclo~>urc in that he failed to give noti<"e 
of the sale and failed to make a return of the sule as re-
(tuired by ihe statute. Mortgagee brought suit for fore-
closure ol' the mortgaged debt of $4500 and mortgagee df'-
fended claiming the debt canceled by virtue of non-com-
pliance with tJre statute by mortgagee and for damages 
plus $25.00. The triul court applied the statute, found 
that the rnor·tgagor had been damag·cd in the sum of 
$138 by the unlawful sule and awarded him a 825 penalty 
for non-complianC'e \\·ith the statute and entered _judg-
ment canceling the mortgages of record and dismissing 
the mortgagee's complaint r·or the deficiency due on the 
indebtedness and awarded the defendant mortgagor $163 
damages. The Wisconsin Supreme C'ourt held that the 
portion of the statute providing that "the debt secured 
by such mortgage shull be deemed fully mti ~fied and 
the mortgage canceled" was unconstitutional as a -...--iola-
tion of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment 
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to the Con8titution of the Cnited States on the ground 
that it was arbitrary and unreasonable. The Court in 
its opinion ;;tates as follows: 
"The taking by a state of the privaie prop-
erty of one person or corporation, without the 
owner',; consent, for the pri-.,-ate use of anotlwr. 
i~ not due proec~s of law, and i~ a violation of 
the J'ourtccnth article of Amendment of the Con-
><titution of the rnited States." 
"It i~ tmder this eon<'ept of dne rn·or·('~~ that 
state courts have helrl that propE"rly rights cannot 
be taken from one person and transferred to 
another by legislative action, in whatever form 
those rights may be. Gilman v. 'l'ncker, 128 1\'.Y. 
190, ~il X.E. 1040, 13 L. R .A.. 304, :w Am. Rep. 
464; Xew g.ngland Trout & Salmon Club Y. 
Mather, 68 Vt. :J38. 35 A. 3~~~. 33 T,. R A. 369; 
Dennis v. J.{oses, 18 "\Va~l1. ;J37, ;)2 P. 333, 40 L. 
K .A.. 302; Roekwcll v. Nearing, 35 N. Y. :JU:.!; 
'l'aylor v. Portr:-r, .t llill (X. Y.) 140, HI, .j.(\ Am. 
Dec. :.!74; Williamfi v. Village of Port Chester, 72 
App. Div. 50:1, 76 S. Y. S. 631, 635; Kinney v. 
Beve!"l0y, 2 Hen. & },L (U Va.) 318, 336; Quimby 
v. Hazen, 3± Vt. 132, HO; ~tate ex rel Ch.apuw.ll 
v. Medical Borad, .'"1-1- .Minn. 387, 20 X.W. 123; 
.Meffert v. State Board, 66 Kan. 710, <2 P. 2±7, 
1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 811; Brown Y. Boat·d of Levee 
Com'rs, 50 \Ii><~. 4G8, 4<9." 
''The ~upremr. Court of the l"nited States 
ha~ expre~~l~· held that a 6tatute whirl1 b~· its 
terms e:o:~\('h penaltie~ beyond the hounds of 
reason is un,·onstitutional. SoutJnvestern T. & 'f. 
Co. v. Danaher, 238 L. S. 41:'2, ::;.", S. Ct. S::l,J, 8tl~. 
59 L . .HJd. l+Jfl, L. K A. 191(i,\, !::US; },fi~somi 
Pacific R Co. v. 'l'ucker, 230 FS. ::i-10, ;;3 i~. Ct. 
961, fl63, 07 L. Ed. 1507; Kansas C'ity S. R. Co. 
10 
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v .. Anderson, 233, C. A. :125, 34 S. Ct. 599, JS J.J. 
Ed. 983; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 12il, 28 S. 
Ct. 441, 52 L . .~<;d. 741., 13 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 93~, 
14 Ann. Cas. 764; \Villeox v. Consolidated Gas 
Co., 212 C. S. 19, 29 S. Ct. 192, 53 L. 1-Jd. BR2, 
48 L. R. A. (~. S.) 1134, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034. 'l'o 
the same point are Ex pa rtf' \Vood (C. C.) 153 
P. 190; Beckler Prod. Co. Y. American Express 
Co., 15G Ark. 29G, 246 S. W. 1. 26 A. L. H. lUJ"I: 
State v. Cra·wford, 74 Wash. 248, 1Cl3 P. !'i00, 4G 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039. See note 01.1 this snl:,ir·r~ 
in 46 L. H. ..:\. (X.S.) in connection witl• the 
report of the ca~e last cited. In all of the~e cfHWS, 
it i~ held that a penalty that is unreasonable in 
amount deprive,; the penalized party of his _prop-
erty without due process. The penult;· here is 
dearly subject to the same condemnation as those 
involved in the cases cited. In the Tud{er easr. 
supra, a penalty of $500 impm;ed by ~lat1lte for 
charging a flhipper a freight rate in Po.<"('S:-' of a 
statutory rate was held lo rrnrlcr Hw pr:malt~­
provision void. 'l'lw opinion s~ates: ''It will he 
preceived that this liability is not )n·oportionPd to 
the actual damap:es .... A~ applied to caees like 
the present, tlw impol':'ition of $500 a~ li<tuidntc"l 
damage!\ i8 nol only gl'O~sl.v ont of _proportion to 
the possible actual damages, but is so arhiJmrY 
and appressive that its cnl'orcement would l1e 
nothing short of the taking of property without 
due procefls of law, and therefore in eontravt>nlion 
of the 14th Amendment." 
"The de~icions of th0 United Statt>fl Sn]:r'''I'W 
Court that have uphelrl penaltie~ as rea~mwhlc 
reC'ognize the prinrJiple that to he upheld theY 
must be reasonable. Water~-Picree Oil i_'o. 1·. 
Texas, 212 "C. S. 86, 29 S. Ct. 220, 53 L. Ed. HI; 
Chicago & ).1. W. Ry. Co. v . .:\y(', etc., Co., 2GU 
11 
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l~. S. :J5, 43 S. Ct. 55, 67 L. Ed. 115; Life & 
Casualty Ins. Co. ol' 'Tenn. v. McCray, 291 r. S. 
566, 54 S. Ct. 482 485, 78 L. Ed. 987. In the last 
case cited, it is said that the principle applL's 
'·though the increment to ihC' judgment he classi-
fied as penal, if the amount is not imrnod1.·nlte. 
The measure, not the name, controls." 'I'lris 
court has enunciated the principle in St.1te Y. 
Redmon, 134 Wis. S!J, 114 X.W. 131, 1~8, 1-l L. 
R. A. (X.S.) 229, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 15 Ann. 
Cas. 408, as is shown below. It ,,.a~ hehl l1Y the 
New Jer~ey Court of ~\ppeal~ in Cigarm~k1;rs' 
Cnion v. Goldberg, 72 J\'. ,J. Law, 21-1-, 61 A. 457, 
70 L. R. A. 156, 111 Am. St. Rep. 662, that dur 
process of law requires that in the infli1.•tion of 
penaltiP~ hy Leg-islatun;s, the Legislature ~lioul!l 
prescribe the amount of the penalty, or >'0Ll" 
definite standard for fixing th0 amount, or that 
the amount should be determined in a judi!•id 
proceedings instituted against the offendn 'l'~w 
statute }wre involw;d, after fjxing the amom1t rrf 
the penalty at $25, and the damage~ to the mort-
gagor, goe:o on to inflict as further penaltY a for-
feitute of the whole debt, whether it hr ~.).000. :ts 
here, or 5 cents in another case. The latter pen-
alty has no relation whatever either to the injlF~­
inflicted upon the dchtor. to the turpitude in-
volved in the statutory violation. or to ::.ny injur:· 
to the publie. Tt. i;; nothing hut arbitrary expro-
priation, tl1e taking of a creditor's property re-
gardless of the amount or value thereof. and con-
ferring it upon the debtor. It is inflietin;:; on 
one person for the omission of a statutory duty 
a penalty differrnt in amount from that inflicted 
on another person for violation of the same duty 
under the same circumstances, and is tim~ llr:l:··-
JJJg· to persons ti1e equal protrdion of the bw." 
12 
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"Tt is contended the penalty provi:;1on ma,v 
be upheld as an exercise of the police power. But 
~tatutes under the police power must be reason-
able. This court said in State v. Redmon, mpra: 
'In general, as before shown, all police rq;ulations 
must bear l.l1e judicial test of reasonahlrness 
undN all the circumstm1ce~. This doctrine is 
being more and more emphasized as the numbL•l' 
of pOlice regulations multiply, e>incin~· n tend-
encv to fence in individual freedom a8 to matters 
not' fonnedy so narrowed Ly lPgislative enad-
ments.' ... Illu~tratiYe of that it i~ said in Plec;~y 
v. Ferguson, 163 "C. S. 5;17, 16 >:-'. Ct. 1138, 41 L. 
Ed. 256, that ev1•ry Jegi~lative exerei~e or the 
police power must be reasonable, and in Rideout. 
\·.Knox, 148 }.lass. 36B, Hl N. E. :l90, 2 L. R. A. 
81, 12 Am. St. H.ep. 560, that rcasonahlenes~ is one 
of the inherent limitations of such power.'" 
"State v. Redmon, sUJil'a, also treat;; ex-
haustively of the police power and points out 
that two things must exist to smtain a statute 
enacted in the exercise of this power. After gnot.-
ing from Lawton v. StAPle, 152 u.s. !33, 137, 14 s_ 
C't.. 4-99, 38 L. ~;d, CIS.): "''To ,justif~· the state in 
thus interposing its authorit:- in behalf of the 
public, it must appear, first, that the interp;,ts 
of the public generally, a8 distingui~lwd from 
those of a partirular dass, require such inter-
ferenc.e; and, second, that the means are rrason-
ably nerRssa1·y for the accomplishment of thP. pur-
pose, and not unduly oppressive upon individ-
ual,:.' 1he coul't comments as follow~; 'Con-
trolling ,;igni l'icaMI' ~hould lJe attached to tlw 
words above quoted, "(.he interests of I he publi" 
generally," etc., ·'require such interferencP." Xot 
that some individuals now and then, or even 
generally demand it, or require it. In otliL·r 
13 
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words, that it is rRao;onably essential or neces-
sary to sueh interests that the subject thereof 
should be dealt with by the legi~laturR.' and 
o:tatc~ that enactments l.lllder the police power 
must meet the test as stated by See. 14.'l, Freund, 
.Police Power: "Does a dailgcr exist"/ h it n:" 
sufficient magnitude'! Does.it concern the .illl;,_ 
lie Does the proposed measure tend to remove 
iU Is the restraint or requirement in proportion 
to the dangerf ls it possible to secure the object 
sought without impairing essential righst and 
principles!" 
''It is for the court to decide 'whether it 
really relates to a legitimate subject, or under the 
gui~e of doing ~o \'iolate~ rights of p0rson~ or 
property.' State v. R.edrnon, 134 \Vis. 89,107,114 
N. VV. 137, 141, l+ L. R. A. (N. S.) :.!:28, 126 Am. 
St. Rep. 1003. 13 AmL Ca~. 408. As stated in 
}l ugler v. Kansar<, 123 F. S. 623, 661, 8 8. Ct. :2i3 
297, 31 L. Ed. 205: "l'he courts are not bound by 
mere forms, nor are they to he mio;led Ly mrre 
pretensse. They are at liberty, indeed, are under 
a solemn duty, to look at the substance of things, 
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether 
the legislature lms trano;cended the limits of it~ 
authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting 
to have been enacted to protect the public health, 
the public morals, or the public safety, has no 
real or substantial relation to those object<>, or 
is a palpable invasion of the rights secured by 
the fundamental la11·, it is the duty of the courts 
to so ajudge, and thereby give effect to the ('AJll-
stitution.' " 
"The penalizing provision here involvE'd does 
not meet the above test. If it be said that the 
pnblic interest is so involyed a<> to justify some 
penalty, all reasonable requirements in that rc-
14 
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gard are met by the $25 penalt.v and the stipula-
tion as to recovery of all damage,; »m;tained. A 
greater penalty than $25 doubtless might reason-
alJly have been imposed. Penalties or double or 
treble damages have been upheld. But to go thr 
extent here attempted in imposing tJw penalty 
under consideration is utterly unn'asonallie, 'a 
palpable invasion of rights ~ecured b;t the funda-
mE'ntallaw' and 'unduly oppressive,' a11d it i~ onr 
duty 'to so adjudge and thereby give dl"r,("j to the 
constitution.' " 
"'l'he penalizing provision~ or the ~tatute are 
not ~nvrd hy the fact that the transfer of the 
property is to be effected in tl1C ~":PiSC or a 
penalty." 
In Rc Deming's Guardiamhip, (Wasl1.) 73 P. 2nd 
764, the court considered a statute awarding a ward a 
lOS· penalty for railur·p of the guardian to render an 
accounting at the time required by statute. The court 
in holding the penalty unconstitutional ~tatcd: 
"}[anifestly, the 10 per eent is a penalty and 
and not a compensatioc1. Brown v. Kildea, :'iS 
·wash. 184, 108 P. 452, 1133. Its imposition doc~ 
not depend upon the existencr of any da111:1.cu• 
whatsoever. A penalty may hr so rx1·b~ivc as 
to amount to a deprivation of proper·(:· 11-itlwut 
due proces~ of la>v. Southwe~1rrn 'l'el. & Tel. Co. 
v. Danaher, 238 L". 8. 482, 35 S. Ct. 8R6, 39 L. E~~-
1419, L. R. A. 191GA, 1108; Suprr·ior LaundrY 
('o. v. Rosr, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N. ~;. 761, 13n ~:­
E. 142,26 A. L. R. 1392; Stierlro v. Rohmo;;rr, :218 
\Vi~. 149,260 X.\\'. 647:12 C. J. 12-Hl-1~-li, ~P{". 
1031, 1032." 
"It is true that the hnv a~ it stands afford~ 
a court an opportunity t.o pnni>'lt a guardian, who 
15 
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may have been ~low in filing hi~ accounts, for 
other derelictions of duty, but this is not an ad-
mirable theory, or one which either Legislatures 
or oourts should encourage. A default by a trustee 
should carry its own appropriate penalt~·, and a 
statute which may permit the imposition of dc-
servL·d punis}unr•nt in a case i11 whid1 the law 
faib to provide an adequate per•al!y i,; J•ot, for 
that reason, to be upheld, if, considered in con-
nedion \\·i!.h its clearly expressed purpose, it is 
ohnoxiouJ; to certain well-organized legal prin-
ciples. As we read the penalty ~tatute in the light 
of the laws of Indiana and the dPcisiom of tlw 
Supreme Court of that state, and in consideration 
of the fact t11at in this jurisdiction there is no 
statute providing a penalty to be H·~t1;d upoTJ a 
guardian in case of his mi~wppropriation of his 
ward's property, \n' cannot but condude that thl' 
statute in que~tion makes mandatory :::o scverl' 
a penalty for· whaL ~ill often amount to no more 
than a trivial departure from a guardian's stut-
utorJ- duties, resultig in no damage to his ward, 
as to amount to deprivation of propert:- without 
dUf~ proee~s of law." 
"Careful COil~idPration of the ~tatl':r now 
under discussion, in the light of tlu• authoritie,, 
convinces us that the pn1vi~ion tlwreof purport-
ing to impose a 10 per cent pcnalt_,. for failure to 
rile a verifiNl account w!thin tllf' timr limited h 
la\1· i~ arbitrary, unjust, and discriminatory i~ 
rot based upon any reasonable theor;o· of corn-
pensation. and that the ~ume is ron~equently 
void u~ amounting to taking proywr·:_,. without 
duE' pm1'PS~ of h1w. \Ve ;ceeordingly hold tha7 
the portion of the law purporting to impo~e a 10 
per rent penalty for failure to file a vrrified 
account within the tinw limited by Ia\\" is. vod 
and of no effect." 
16 
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Additional citations and cases may be found in the 
text of the above decisions. To recite them independ-
t>nlly in tlti~ brief would amount to supernurnerat.ion of 
citations already before the Court. 
The reasoning of the above decisions at·e equally ap-
plicable to the due process clame of thE' Constitution of 
Otah, Article 1, Section 7, which provides "No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property -..dthout due 
proce:;~ of law." 
Though the words ''J'OJ·feiture" or ·'penalty" are not 
used in :Section 41-3-3, the actual effeet of 41-3-3 is to 
forfeit to Peters Plumbing ami Heating Company the 
automobile and property rights of the plaintifr, 
Clearfield State Bank. 
An ('Xttlllination of the conditional sale~ <"onfract at-
tached to the <"omplaint indie~te;; that Peter~ Plumbing 
and Heating Company agreed to purchase the 1958 
Chevrolet fo1· a total prin~ of $2,0:)3.00. Peters Plumb-
ing and Heating Company paid eash in the ~\\Ill or 
$1,000.00, traded in an automobile for the agreed value 
of $395.00 and agr0ed to va.v the unpaid cash ·balance 
of $1,160 )Jlus insurance of $86.00, license and transfer 
fees of $4.00 and the time price difereniial of $2:'i.OO, 
in monthly installment~, the total eontract balanc•c being 
$1,275.00 to be paid by Peters Plumbing and Heating. 
For the conditional sale~ contraet the plaintiff ha;; paid 
money to George B. \Ve~t and i;; out $1.275 or the Chev-
rolet automobile sold to Peter"6 Pluml1ing and Heating 
Company. Peter,; PlLunbing and Heating Company are, 
at most, out $1,000 plus the value of the trade-in at 
the time ol" the transaetion. The effect of 41-3-3 as ap-
11 
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plied in this ea;;e i5 to transfer to Peters Plumbing and 
Heating Company the property of the plaintiff in the 
amount of Sl,275.00 and result~ in an unjust ·enrichment 
of Peters Plumbing and Heating Company. 
Peters Plumhing and Hl·ating Company is not with-
out its remedy. It may have its damages from the 
dealer, George B. We~l, upon the contract and in ad-
dition Jm~ its right of action agaimt the bond of George 
B. \Vest as an automobile dealer. Should tht- Court see 
fit tn quiet title i11 the plaintiff, Pelers Plumbing and 
Heating Company will have its bargain upon the pay-
ment of the contract balance and ·will suffer no damage. 
Salt Lake Auto Auction, Inc. ha~ it,; rights against 
the dealer, GeorgE> B. \Vest, and perhaps the dealer's 
hondsman, for it;; purchase money if it has not been 
paid. 'l'J1ere is no evidenc-e before the Court or in the 
record indicating what the exact nature of the tran~· 
action between "\Ve~t and Sail Lake Auto Auction was. 
As Salt Lake Auto Auction may enforce its contract, 
it suffers no damag0. 
The Utal-1 statute, 41-3-3, like the Wisconsin statute 
and other statutes considered in the cases herinabove 
cited, is not uniform in its application as between dif-
ferenct contracting parties or differenct automobile sales 
tran!lactions, and like such stututc~. arbitrarily forfeits 
to the Vf"ndee the propr•rty of the vendor, or a bona 
fide purclm~l·:· for value of the ("nntrrrd and title of the 
vendor, regardless of whethf"r tlte damage of vendee 
i.~ oi" $1.00 or $1,000.00 or whether the value of the 
property forfeik1l to the vendee i,.; $1.00 or $5,000.00. 
Tliu><, between various trUll~twtin.~ parties or various 
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and different sale~ transactions there 1s no uniformity 
in the amount of the forfeiture. 
In the application of the statute the forfeiture is not 
only gro~~ly out of pro1wdion to the possible actual 
damage ]JUt is so arbitrary, oppressive and without uni-
formity in its applkation that it::; enforcement would be 
taking of property without due process of law and con-
trary to the due process clause of the Con~titutiom ol' 
the Lnited State::; of Ameriea and ihe State of Utah. 
But for the provisions of 41-il-:l, the right::; ol' the parties 
can be adju~ted at a trial and their respective damages, 
if any, deterrnilJed and adju::;tcd and justice can better 
be served. 
POTN'l' V. 
41-3-3, UTAH CODE AX.i\OTA'l'ED 1953, DIRCRIJ\-1-
I)l"ATES AGAINST AUTOMOBILE Sl<JLLJ<~RS AND 
AUTm10BILE SAI.ES TRANSACTIONS CO:N-
'l'RARY TO 'l'HliJ (_!ONSTITCTIOX OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND OF 'I.'HliJ STA'rJ<~ OF' 
l"l'AH. 
The provisions of 41-3-3 di~criminates again~t and 
applie~ only to automobile sales and persons selling 
automobiles and doe~ not apply to any other sale:> trans-
actions. Any person, firm or corporation may sell a 
boat, machine, appliamJ(', jewelry, prod1wt or any chattel, 
and should such a venrlor fail or refuse to furnish a bill 
of sale or evidence of title at any given moment or time, 
he i~ liable only under l1i::; contract of sale for the ven-
d(:es' damages, if any there be. Even real t>~talr,, whether 
of the value of $1,000.00 or $100,000.00, can be sold· and 
should the vendor rail or refuse to deliver a deed or 
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evidence of title to the property sold at a particular time, 
the parties are left to their remedies under the contract. 
Only an aut.oinolJile dealer or seller mu~t .forfeit his 
property to the purchaser for l1is failure to furnish evi-
dence of lit.le. Under the laws of ljtah, there is no for-
(()iture of a seller's property to the purchaser in any 
form of sale~ transaction excepting au';omobile sales. 
1'here is no ba~is or justification or reao;oTiable 
reason for singling out automobile sales and sellers and 
burdening them with special legislation and special for-
feitures as has been done with the enactment of 41-3-3. 
Auto sales transaction~ should be governed by the same 
laws and rules as other mles. There is as equal an op-
portunity for fraud and irr'egularity in transactions in-
volving property otliCT' than automobiles as tlwrc i~ in 
automobile sales. In the ease of an automobile sale there 
is no better rea~ou or basis for penalizing sellers for the 
non-performance of a contract than there is for penal-
izing others. 
Respeeifully ~ubmitted, 
E. llrORGA.:-.1 \\'lXm,f 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant 
1010 Fir~t SC'('Ill'i!Y Bank Building 
Ogden, ll tah 
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